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Jersey City, New Jersey 07311-3881
Comment Letter on April 15, 1998 Omnibus Ethics Exposure Draft, 
Limited to “Proposed Interpretation Under Rule 101:
The Effect of Alternative Practice Structures on the Applicability of 
Independence Rules”
Dear Mr. Finkston:
The staff of the Independence Standards Board is pleased to offer 
the following comments on your exposure draft relating to 








comments represent solely the views of the ISB staff, rather than 
those of the ISB, which develops its positions only after extensive 
due process and deliberation.
We agree that this difficult and important new subject needs to be 
addressed. However, we believe that the ramifications of 
“alternative practice structures” on auditor independence matters 
are deceptively broad, and therefore that the subject requires 
substantive additional attention before the issuance of a final ethics 
pronouncement.
Although we recognize that, historically, final ethics interpretations 
have not provided significant background discussions on their 
subject matters, we suggest that in this important “practice 
environment” case more introductory discussion be provided to 
help practitioners better understand the thought process that led to
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the conclusions. For example, we believe there is a need to clarify why this issue is 
new and different. Here, individuals “directly supervise or directly control” 
(paragraph 1 of the exposure draft) the owners of Newfirm and another party 
“indirectly controls” (paragraph 3 of the exposure draft) the accounting/ attest firm, 
and this fact pattern is not addressed in present literature. Existing Interpretation 101- 
9 addresses the reverse case, classifying as a “member” for independence purposes 
any entity “whose operating, financial or accounting policies can be controlled” by 
the firm in a FAS 94 financial interests/ voting control sense. Before the 
interpretation addresses the independence aspects of the new practice structure, we 
believe it would be appropriate to better set the stage for an understanding of the 
substance and significance of that new structure and its relationship (or lack thereof) 
to the existing independence literature.
We also have several comments and concerns regarding substantive elements of the 
proposal, as follows.
1. Paragraph 3 of the exposure draft acknowledges that certain PublicCo personnel 
“indirectly control” and influence Newfirm, yet only selected independence rules 
are proposed - in particular, PublicCo is not deemed to be a “member.” When 
such effective control exists, is PEEC satisfied that the proposed limited 
independence requirements sufficiently address the independence needs? Or, for 
example, should PublicCo be deemed a “member?”
Present rules (for “members”) prohibit stock ownership and most loans to and 
from a client without regard to materiality. Why shouldn’t that same standard 
apply to PublicCo? One easily could argue that an immaterial investment or loan 
by a “member” should not impair independence, but that is not what the present 
rules provide. The justification, in this case, for an exception to the rules that bind 
others has not been articulated.
2. The ISB staff believes that an analysis of the potential threats to independence 
generally is helpful when studying auditor independence questions, and would be 
helpful in this case. For example, “de facto parent” PublicCo controls Newfirm, 
yet it would be permitted to perform many services for, and have relationships 
with, Newfirm attest clients - services and relationships which Newfirm would be 
prohibited from providing.
As a result, PublicCo can have immaterial (to it) investments in and loans to attest 
clients of Newfirm. But even if immaterial, would the partners and staff of 
Newfirm, who are employees of PublicCo, hesitate to challenge the accounting or 





these partners and staff be concerned that PublicCo officials might respond by 
applying economic or other sanctions against them? Furthermore, if the partners 
and staff of Newfirm have ownership interests in PublicCo, or stock options, is 
there a legitimate concern that such an investment could affect their behavior in 
conducting an audit of such a client? We recognize the proposed limitation that 
investments and loans have to be immaterial to PublicCo, but is that the 
appropriate threshold? Are there other safeguards that should be required? For 
example, should there be rules regarding the relative size of investments in 
PublicCo by the individuals conducting the audits of companies with which 
PublicCo has investment, loan or other relationships which are proscribed for an 
auditor?
For purposes of the foregoing discussion, we have assumed that all of the income 
of the partners and (rented) staff of Newfirm comes directly or indirectly from 
PublicCo, since even the earnings of Newfirm can be determined by rental and 
other management agreement charges by PublicCo. That is, for all substantive 
purposes, the partners are full-time employees of PublicCo, who in addition retain 
personal financial and professional responsibility for the audits they supervise for 
Newfirm.
3. The proposed changes would govern a very visible area of practice - for example, 
we can anticipate PublicCo media advertisements or direct mailings for “CPAs” 
performing tax and financial planning services. Even if independence questions 
were satisfactorily resolved within the profession, what would be the effect of the 
proposal upon the users of financial statements? Would the perception of the 
investing public easily be persuaded that Newfirm personnel were not influenced 
in their attest work by their employment and other economic interests with 
PublicCo? For example, one can envision a situation where:
• PublicCo has a loan to Company X
• Company X is audited by Newfirm
• Mr. A owns shares in Company X and knows of PublicCo’s loan
• Mr. A has his personal tax work done by PublicCo
• Mr. A learns that the PublicCo employee doing his tax work, in his 
capacity as a partner in Newfirm, is also the auditor of Company X.
Would Mr. A be comfortable with the independence of Company X’s auditor?
4. We also are concerned as to whether full consideration has been given to the 
important possible ramifications of this proposed approach to firms that presently 





develop ways to restructure themselves (even by “giving up control”) to take 
advantage of this proposal, thereby allowing their “affiliates” to provide services 
to audit clients which they now cannot provide? If so, would there be sufficient 
support for their “indirect” performance of those services now proscribed? (Note 
that the introductory paragraph to the exposure draft states as one of its purposes: 
“to ensure that members who practice in an alternative practice structure are not 
permitted to act in a manner in which members who practice in a traditional 
structure cannot.” Would the proposal effectively result in comparability by 
“lowering the standards” for both? Some would infer that the proposal is more of 
a change in the rules than its intended “leveling of the playing field.”)
5. We have been informally advised that there may be an international precedent that 
would be of relevance on this question. Specifically, we have been told that in the 
past in certain countries (e.g., Germany and Switzerland) accounting firms 
partially or wholly-owned by banks were allowed to report on companies in 
which the banks had made loans or investments, but that the rules were changed 
to no longer allow this. We have requested further information about these 
situations and will share with you any responses which are helpful.
6. Finally, we believe there may be a need to consider other possible variations of 
the specific alternative practice structure described in the exposure draft. If 
principles and criteria can be presented that would apply to future variations as 
well as the present structure, that would be helpful. Has PEEC considered the 
degree to which other variations exist or are likely to come into being, and 
whether the proposal’s criteria are appropriately broad to provide guidance for 
those other variations as well? To the degree that other alternative structures are 
known, one way to consider this question might be to test the proposals in the 
exposure draft against those other structures.






Lynn Turner, SEC Chief Accountant
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